







The present volume of Phenomenology and mind is dedicated to the topic of 
habit, especially in its personal and social aspects. The phenomenological 
tradition has produced a number of interesting and fruitful reflections on 
habits, importantly challenging the often too sharply drawn distinction 
between nature and culture.  The notion of habit is crucial in understanding 
husserl’s phenomenology. The ante-predicative framing of types in 
perception and the felt movement of the lived-body, the framing of position-
takings in logically, evaluatively, and practically formed judgments, the 
rational stances one can adopt, e.g., in interpersonal discourse, or the 
attitudes shaping one’s conceptual grasp of the world – in all these instances 
conscious life decisively involves elements of habit (types, positions, stances, 
attitudes, etc.).
The notion of habit, of course, does not first emerge within the intellectual 
milieu of the phenomenological movement.  indeed, the discourse on 
habit in phenomenology’s precursors may prove quite helpful in making 
sense of certain currents in (especially Francophone) phenomenology.  it 
has been a significant subject of discussion and controversy throughout 
philosophy’s history, ranging from aristotle’s treatment of hexis and its 
reception as habitus in Thomas aquinas’ psychology, to hume’s critical 
analysis of ‘powers’, and further on to the French vitalists and Bergson, who 
had an important role also in merleu-Ponty’s transformation of husserl’s 
phenomenology of the lived-body.  in the 20th, century the concept was 
imbued with great social relevance. gehlen’s philosophical anthropology, 
for instance, gave a foundational role to ‘habits’ in the stabilizing of social 
institutions.  Schütz and some of his followers, like Berger and luckmann, 
analyzed habits in relation to the life-world.  But it was perhaps Bourdieu’s 
sociology that really made the concept of ‘habitus’ prominent within the 
social sciences and the humanities.
we think that phenomenology has far from exhausted its potential to 
clarify the concept of habit and advance the discussion further.  To that 
end, the current volume, on “mind, habits and Social reality,” brings 
together a number of contributions in an attempt to put on display both 
the profound depth, systematic import, and the thematic breadth that a 
phenomenological treatment of the notion of habit can possess.
Session i introduces genetic phenomenology with an overview of husserl’s 
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broad and differentiated understanding of the habitual self (Moran) 
and offers a specific focus on the phenomenology of types, with an eye 
to hume’s account of induction (Lohmar), as husserl’s most original 
account of habits, as well as on the quasi-existential application of genetic 
phenomenology to situational intentionality (Ferencz-Flatz) and also to the 
social structure of the life-world (Da Costa).  in Session ii, habit is elucidated 
ontogenetically (Sheets-Johnstone) and its peculiar teleological sensitivity 
to circumstances (Zhok) is brought to the fore.  The history of the concept 
of habit is also mobilized to engage the problem of the naturalization of the 
mind (Efal), while marleau-Ponty’s and ricoeur’s phenomenology are shown 
to assuage certain problematic assumptions about habit (McGuirk), and, 
lastly, habit is argued to be pertinent to the current debate on extended 
mind.  Session iii is dedicated to the social and normative character of habit, 
critically taking stock of Bourdieu’s seminal sociological theory of habit 
(Crossley) and enhancing it phenomenologically to make room for social 
creativity (Kokoszka). on the other hand, from a non-Bourdieuian point 
of view, a reciprocal habitual influence of individual and society on values 
is posited (Scalambrino), and, turning toward the individual, we are given 
an analysis of the intertwining of passive and active habits in personal 
position taking (Arango).  Finally, in Session iV we offer two further 
resources for understanding habits: the english version of Rochus Sowa’s 
article on episodic and non-episodic intentionality (“episodische und nicht-
episodische intentionalität Zur konstitutiven Funktion der epistemischen 
habitualitäten des wissens und glaubens bei edmund husserl”, published in 
fenomenologia, Vol. 12, 2014) and an annotated bibliography on habits edited 
by Marco Cavallaro.
returning now in a little more detail to the present volume’s contents, 
Session I introduce genetic phenomenology, focusing on its most 
characteristic contribution to our understanding of the realm of habits: its 
theory of habituality and types.
Dermot Moran’s contribution “‘The ego as Substrate of habitualities: 
edmund husserl’s Phenomenology of the habitual Self” analyzes and 
contextualizes many different terms husserl uses to theorize about the 
domain of habit.  although husserl rarely gives an explicit methodological 
reflection on its operative value, habit appears to be the key concept of 
genetic phenomenology.  Moran collects therefore the main occurrences 
of terms related to habit in the husserliana volumes and elucidates their 
systematic relevance, showing how phenomenology reveals habit as present 
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at all levels of human behavior, from the lower drives, bodily intentionality 
right up to rationality in theoretical, practical and emotional life. The 
transcendental clarification of epistemic attitudes relates methodologically 
to the role of scientific habits and their sedimentation. Convictions, 
decisions and sentiments are all habits “layered over on each other in very 
complex intertwined ways” that constitute selves as stable and abiding 
egos, giving them their “weight” in individual and social life.  disclosing the 
operative concept of habit in husserl’s disparate phenomenological analyses 
and juxtaposing the latter with (among others) heidegger’s, gadamer’s and 
Bourdieu’s own developments, Moran’s article clears the ground for further 
in-depth studies on the phenomenology of habits.
in his article “Types and habits. habits and their cognitive Background 
in hume and husserl”, Dieter Lohmar explores husserl’s most original 
development of genetic phenomenology.  The concept of type refers to 
pre-predicative forms of knowledge.  Lohmar defines ‘type’ as a form of 
pre-knowledge of singular objects or events (individual types) or of a class 
of objects or events (general types).  Types are contrasted with empirical 
concepts of everyday life, respectively as a similarity group bound to a 
finite number of experiences and as the result of idealizations that grasp 
what is common to an infinite manifold of possible objects.  Types show a 
unique aspect of mental life characterized by preservation of knowledge and 
gradual adaption to changing circumstances.  despite this conservatism, 
types, as leading and guiding operations in perception and action, are 
quite flexible frameworks of sense, being powerful and effective tools of 
pre-knowledge.  lohmar underlines their role in various pre-predicative 
realms of cognition, which, as he claims, the human mind shares with other 
animals, too.  Finally, he sketches some systematic comparisons between 
husserl’s genetic phenomenology and hume’s understanding of habits.
against the background of husserl’s theory of types, Christian Ferencz-
Flatz gives a phenomenological account of the notion of ‘situation’ in his 
paper “A Phenomenology of Automatism: Habit and Situational Typification 
in husserl”. moving from the existential tension between situational 
facticity and the demand of free decisions, the author discusses the 
details of husserl’s genetic-phenomenological understanding of situation 
as a peculiar form of total-configuration (Gesamtkonfiguration).  The 
apperceptive unity of situational typification is treated both in its noetic 
as in its noematic character, stressing the dynamic role of expectations 
and embodied potentialities.  Thus, situation is defined as the “intentional 
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living unity of horizonal context and subjective potentiality”.  Ferencz-
Flatz focuses his attention on three main aspects of the phenomenology 
of situation: the role of interests in the shaping of experience, periodicity, 
and the emergence of a secondary normativity. Situations are organized 
through complex processes of time patterns contingent on subjective and 
environmental constraints and rhythms. They are structured by habitual 
interests which commit the subject to forms of ‘secondary normativity’, 
i.e. the “secondary passivity of practical preference in an intersubjective, 
generative context.”
intersubjective types or ‘stocks of knowledge at hand’ are the core topic of 
Tomas Da Costa’s “Between Relevance Systems and Typification Structures: 
alfred Schutz on habitual Possessions”. da costa contextualizes the concept 
of type in the work of the founder of Phenomenological Sociology, alfred 
Schutz.  Schutz’s notion of type lies in between weber’s sociological tool 
of ideal-type and husserl’s genetic account of typical appresentation. 
Because of this twofold source, Schutz’s understanding of types is related 
both to forms of idealizations (typifications) and to an empirical concept 
of generality (typicality).  Typicalities and ideal-types are at the generative 
core of Schutz’s description of the structures of the life-world and are 
conceived in his account as essential social features of both mind and 
environment:  even more, they are the instruments through which the 
social world becomes real.  in this regard, the pragmatic turn of Schutz’s 
phenomenology slightly modifies the terms of Husserl’s understanding of 
types, stressing more the role of higher-order idealizations, such as the 
interchangeability of standpoints and the congruency of the system of 
relevancies, rather than focusing on the basic genetic operations that lead 
from previous pre-predicative levels of cognition to the disparate realm of 
idealizations.
The suite of papers comprising Session II of this volume takes on the 
general themes of how habits figure in our mental constitution and mode 
of access to the world.  Fittingly, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, in her article 
“on the origin, nature, and genesis of habit,” opens up the section by 
tackling the question of the mind’s beginnings.  her concern is the relation 
of genesis to ontogenesis.  More specifically, the aim is to gain clarity about 
the phenomenon of habit by taking into account precisely the relation of 
habit to ontogenetic development.  The investigation is inspired by her 
observation that in the analysis of conscious life nothing may be taken for 
granted, or, positively, that every minute detail has its origin and history 
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in past experience.  This is precisely what the notion of habit suggests – 
no habit is given, all habits are acquired.  in her analysis, which focuses 
on habits as patterns of movement, Sheets-Johnstone highlights the 
individuality of habit-acquisition by describing the phenomenon’s relation 
the related phenomenon of style.  The specifically ontogenetic dimension 
of habit is then related to instinctive behaviour, where Sheets-Johnstone 
stresses, following husserl, the character of persons both as free agents and 
natural beings comes to light.
in light of that analysis, Sheets-Johnstone takes issue with recent 
phenomenological work on embodiment and the sense of self, arguing that it 
misconstrues its phenomena of interest by unwittingly assuming an adultist 
stance.  if one instead recognizes the primacy of felt bodily movement – 
something easily overlooked by phenomenologist who, as a matter of fact, 
occupy the standpoint of adults while carrying out their investigations, but 
filling the awareness of the infant at every moment – one can avoid such 
pitfalls.  lastly, Sheets-Johnstone indicates how her ontogenetic approach to 
habit might connect with the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and social 
understanding, inasmuch as we understand others so often by recognizing 
their habitual style.
while the importance of habit for our mental constitution is widely 
recognized, there is a current within philosophy that nevertheless sees 
habit in a somewhat negative light.  This is even apparent in the word’s 
semantic often negative associations with words like “rote,” “mechanical,” 
“blind,” etc.  Andrea Zhok devotes his article, “habit and mind,” to tackling 
this issue and defending habit’s dignity in our mental economy.  indeed, 
since habits are necessary for learning, and we can follow no rule, i.e., 
master no concept or meaning, without learning, a great deal is at stake 
with habit.  in his mission to put on display habit’s merits, Zhok marshals 
the philosophical resources of Peirce and husserl to show how an urge to 
repeat makes habit possible in the first place.
Though it is thanks to Peirce’s notion of abduction that we can recognize 
the need for such an impulse, it is husserl who presents in more detail the 
shape it might actually take.  Zhok locates this impulse in husserl’s account 
of time-consciousness and the process of “temporalization.”  consciously 
retained past experience is transformed and projected in protention, which 
seeks out the same in the further course of experience.  what emerges in 
this analysis, Zhok claims, is the purposive and intelligent character of 
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habit.  indeed, habit has its own logic, being both sensitive to circumstances 
(and so not mechanical) and purposive (and so not blind).  having redeemed 
the notion of habit, he notes that the conception of habit he develops resists 
any thoroughgoingly reductive naturalization because of its teleological 
elements.  nevertheless, in stressing its embodied and embedded character, 
Zhok admits that his view is amenable to a more liberal take on the project 
of naturalizing the mind.
habit is also pertinent to the discourse on naturalization in a more 
historical register, as Adi Efal’s work, titled “naturalization: habits, 
bodies, and their subjects,” shows.  efal charts the conceptual geography 
and philosophical lineage of the notion of habit prior to and leading 
up to its appropriation in the phenomenological tradition.  indeed, 
the work undertaken by efal is essential genealogical work providing 
important background information for understanding how Francophone 
phenomenologists have conceived of habit.  her task is to relate, in 
particular, how the aristotelian-Thomistic conception of habit that keeps 
the material body at a relative distance is overturned in the 19th century 
discourse on habit among such figures as Biran, Ravaisson, and Bergson.  
despite their nuanced differences, the latter, she explains, conceive of habit 
as essential to life precisely as its material presupposition.  She contends 
that this idea opens up the possibility to think of habit in a unified way 
as both material and moral, rather than prising these aspects apart as 
in the aristotelian-Thomistic strategy, an idea that is in need of further 
exploration.
James McGuirk, picking up near where efal’s article leaves off, represents 
the post-husserlian phenomenologies of merleau-Ponty and ricoeur in his 
article “Phenomenological considerations of habit: reason, knowing, and 
self-presence in habitual action,” in which he maintains along with Zhok 
that any conception of habit as merely blind, automatic, and mechanical 
is mistaken.  indeed, to put it positively, habit can be a genuine form 
of knowledge.  mcguirk conceives it as containing both the potential 
for authentic self-expression and a sensitivity to circumstances, pace 
the negative allegations advanced by ryle and heidegger against habit.  
merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology makes prominent the deft, even creative, 
manner in which habit allows one to navigate through the world, while 
ricoeur, especially when he views the phenomenon in hermeneutic terms, 
explains for us how habit can be both opaque (i.e., at least in part beyond 
our conscious grasp) and authentic at the same time.
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The specifically Merleau-Pontian view of habit may also be relevant to 
current debates over the extent of cognition and the so-called extended 
mind hypothesis (emh), namely, the proposal that some cognitive processes 
may by partially constituted by what lies beyond a cognizer’s boundaries 
as an individual organism.  Richard Strong connects the dots between 
merleau-Pontian habit and emh in his article “habit and the extended 
mind: Fleshing out the extended mind Theory with merleau-Pontian 
Phenomenology.”  his goal is not to alter or expand upon the thesis in 
any way, or even to suggest that habit itself extends the mind in any way.  
rather, he argues that the classic presentation of emh in clark and chalmers 
(1998) and its subsequent elaboration in clark (2011) overlooks an important 
way in which embodied habits might figure in the kinds of examples used to 
support emh.  one need not address this problem beginning ex nihilo, Strong 
shows, because merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology already illustrates the way 
embodied habit, in the form of the “body schema,” facilitates the acquisition 
and employment of extended cognitive accessories.  This does not end the 
discussion, Strong suggests, but rather brings into view the variety of real 
strategies subjects may make use of in co-opting their environment to 
better pursue their cognitive ends.
Session III offers phenomenologically driven insights into the 
methodological debate of the social sciences about the tensions between 
individual agency and the social structures. 
Nick Crossley approaches the concept of habit from a sociologist’s point of 
view. after having given a historical introduction on the relevance of the 
concept of habits in sociology and in related phenomenological accounts, 
he aims to clarify the proper validity and the conceptual limitations of 
the term as the main explanatory tool for regular and enduring patterns 
of social interaction. in this regard, the concept of habits is in crossley’s 
account both crucial and limited. he explores the methodological strength 
and the conceptual limits of the term contrasting it with concepts which 
have been often presented as alternative accounts: rules and conventions.  
in the context of ‘theory of practice’ habit is coined by Bourdieu’s 
understanding of it as ‘structuring structures’ that gives the enculturated 
subject a ‘feel for the game’.  with this understanding of habit, one nowadays 
quite familiar in social sciences and humanities, crossley compares winch’s 
theory of social rules and lewis’ conception of convention.
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according to crossley, in contrast to rules and conventions, habit cannot 
grasp the relational nature of social structures, provided it is understood as 
the sedimentation of individual instantiations of social actions in dispositions 
of discrete individuals.  Therefore, social structures, if conceived only through 
habits, are methodological fragmented and individualized in the collection of 
individual dispositions for social tasks and skills.  on the other hand, winch’s 
account can elucidate the fact that rules refer to rational normativity, since 
social practices governed by rules can (and ought to) be viewed in terms of 
their rightness or wrongness.  Thus, this peculiar aspect of social rationality 
can be captured by rules, not by habits, which tends to reduce it to matters of 
fact.  The same goes for Lewis’ definition of convention as coordination and 
agreement for social action.  Both winch and lewis underline aspects of social 
reality that are intrinsically relational and cannot be reduced to individual 
dispositions.
crossley shows, moreover, how habits can lend stability to both rules 
and conventions and durability by anchoring them within the embodied 
subject, beneath the level of reflective decision.  Habits both enable the 
naturalisation of behaviour and put them outside of the realm of discourse, 
as embodied knowledge of something taken-for-granted. Finally, he 
concludes his conceptual clarification showing how habits, rules and 
conventions need to be considered not as key concepts of alternative 
accounts, but as related conceptual tools within an all-compassing frame for 
a future theoretical sociology.
While Crossley gives a sociological clarification of the concept of habit as 
an explanatory tool for regular and enduring patterns of social interaction, 
i.e. for social structures, Valérie Kokoszka enhances Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus phenomenologically by elucidating how social creativity 
(therefore agency in a strong sense) is linked to, but not exhausted by 
habitual dispositions.  She refers to Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus 
as a “generative scheme of practices adapted to objective circumstances” 
as a means to give an account both of social regularities without reducing 
them to inanimate mechanism and of creativity in social interactions 
without taking recourse to a powerful, rational subjectivity capable of 
decoupling itself from social structures.  She calls Bourdieu’s rejection of 
structuralism and subjectivism into question. on one hand, his concept of 
habitual dispositions seems to be linked to a strong “noetisation” of habit, 
i.e. internalisation of all its performativity as a form of Kantian schematism, 
and, on the other hand, the objectivity of the social environment is 
presupposed as a static field and never analysed in its structural relation to 
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the dynamic life of the bearer of habits.  Kokoszka’s suggested enhancement 
moves from her original interpretation of husserl’s genetic phenomenology.
Kokoszka suggests a terminological distinction between habits as 
noetic dispositions and types as noematic schemes.  in her original 
account, she distinguishes genetic phenomenology distinguishes from 
static phenomenology by decidedly sublating the static tendency “to 
noeticize” the intentional field, drawing it into the immanence of the 
transcendental ego.  She then applies this phenomenological innovation 
to Bourdieu’s account where the concept of habits replaces the role of 
transcendental consciousness.  Since the systematic correlation of habits 
as subjective dispositions and of types as objective dispositions of the life-
world stresses the intertwining of embodied subject and environment, 
the social environment can no longer be presupposed as a given field of 
social objectivities and norms that are stabilized by internalized habitual 
dispositions, but as an enactively framed habitat. inhabiting the life-
world, the bearer of habits is not only intertwined with its environment, 
but also called to reply to its affordances and to cultivate it by creating 
material correlates that make it habitable.  Thus, she subtly describes the 
intertwining of passive and active habits, showing how in taking a stance 
in relation to its own cultural environment the hiatus between disposition 
and disposed subject provides the latter the leeway of a relative framework 
of spontaneity and personal cultivation, something absent in Bourdieu’s 
account.  Finally, she addresses Sartre’s description of social institutions as 
material devices for incorporation and embodiment of goals, as well as their 
tendency to degenerate in goal-blind devices for self-conservation.
as crossley’s and Kokoszka’s contribution already suggest, there is a rich 
field of phenomenological research having to do with the sociality of habits.  
Frank Scalambrino, in his article “From a phenomenology of the reciprocal 
nature of habits and values to an intersubjective ground of normative social 
reality,” approaches the same matter from a non-Bourdieuian perspective, 
taking as his primary philosophical resource a phenomenological 
appropriation of aristotle.  There is, Scalambrino shows, a challenging 
problem concerning the place of the individual and the place of the social 
with respect to normativity, namely, about whether the validity of values 
(in their basic experiential, proto-rational form) has its source in the former 
or the latter.  he negotiates this dilemma by pursuing a phenomenological 
analysis that ultimately doesn’t force one to take sides (i.e., in favour of the 
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individual or the social).  one can, instead, strike a balance by conceiving 
of a reciprocal interrelation of the individual and the social insofar as these 
co-contribute to the validity of values.  This is made possible by locating 
the ground of values in habit, which is at the same time an individual and 
a social affair.  only in interpersonal intercourse, Scalambrino argues, 
can we come to an adequate evaluation of the value of a given situation, 
provided that the habitual background of all the individuals involved 
mutually serve as evaluative constraints.  in that way, Scalambrino presents 
a complex picture of habit as the site where the individual and the social 
come together to engender the norms that bind social subjects together in 
interpersonal encounters.
Shifting focus to theorize more specifically about the place of habit in 
the constitution of an individual subject, Alejandro Arango’s paper, 
titled “husserl’s concept of position-taking and second nature,” contains 
a treatment of the notion of second nature.  he views the latter not as 
comprised of habits per se, but more specifically of those dispositional 
tendencies termed “position-takings” [Stellungnahmen].  Arango first takes 
pains to carefully distinguish between pure passivity, e.g., in the form of 
instincts, acquired habits, and, more narrowly, active position-takings.  he 
argues that only position-takings are suitable elements for comprising a 
second nature based on their peculiar motivational character.  The latter 
gives one a kind of self-consistency that is integral to a person’s unity, 
yet a consistency that is not some kind of natural given but which, rather, 
requires active self-formation.  hence, arango concludes, position-takings, 
as acquired principles of self-unification, are precisely what the notion of a 
second nature is meant to capture.  despite this distinction between second 
nature as comprised of position-takings over against one’s more “natural” 
or passive tendencies, husserl’s phenomenology, arango notes in closing, 
weaves the active and the passive together into a non-dualistic, multi-
stratum whole.
with Session IV, the present volume closes with the inclusion of a 
translation into english of an article by Rochus Sowa, titled “episodic and 
non-episodic intentionality: on the constitutive Function of the epistemic 
habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in edmund husserl.”  The article seeks 
to clear up some problematic aspects of husserl’s phenomenology, to which 
end a renewed reflection on the domain of the habitual figures importantly.  
Sowa begins by explaining the difference between the project of a static and 
INTRODUCTION
maTT Bower Beloit College 
emanUele caminada universität zu Köln 
22
of a genetic phenomenology.  The difference can be cashed out in terms of 
a development in husserl’s theory of intentionality: Static phenomenology 
concerns discrete episodes of particular conscious intentional acts, while 
genetic phenomenology concerns non-conscious habits, i.e., horizons 
consisting of empty intentions in which intentional acts are contextualized.  
in particular, Sowa shows, habit, in the form of knowledge, is not an 
occurrent moment within the complex of lived-experiences that comprise 
one’s conscious life.  it is, rather, a way one is disposed.  one doesn’t 
know, truly, by executing a one-off intentional act, but only inasmuch 
as something holds good, i.e., is accepted as valid.  This is a condition, a 
disposition, exceeding conscious awareness, thanks to which one tends to 
produce appropriate acts (empty intentions in perception, judgments in 
knowledge) in appropriate circumstances.
The threatening consequence emerges, then, that the phenomenologist is 
cut off from these putatively noetic “phenomena,” as they do not properly 
appear, and accordingly cannot be described.  indeed, the threat is, as Sowa 
sees it, to the very idea of intentional correlation.  his solution comes with 
the notion he introduces of “gewusstsein,” for which the best we can do in 
english is “knownness.”  So explains that nothing new is thereby added to 
the contents of conscious awareness.  rather, knownness follows from the 
recognition that our acts have motivational antecedents of which we are 
not aware.  Prior experience, belief, or knowledge may fall into complete 
obscurity for consciousness. yet it remains “present” and even “in view” 
inasmuch as our acts in the present continue to have it for their motivation, 
though without its coming to conscious awareness.  This is how, moreover, 
our belief in the world functions, Sowa argues, as something that holds good 
beyond our awareness.
The last piece in the volume is an extensive, lightly annotated bibliography 
of literature on the topic of habit, generously compiled by Marco Cavallaro.  
For ease of use, the bibliography is divided into four main parts.  The first 
part covers edmund husserl’s engagement with the topic of habit, which, 
in turn, is grouped into three categories: his primary published works; 
the published manuscripts, lectures, and essays; and references to yet 
unpublished manuscripts.  The second part of the bibliography lists primary 
works by other authors working in the phenomenological tradition, and 
the third covers the secondary literature dealing with the notion of habit 
in phenomenological terms.  lastly, the fourth part presents a sampling of 
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work on habit exemplifying perspectives beyond phenomenology, including 
figures in the history of philosophy, more recent philosophy (analytic and 
continental), and some offerings from outside of philosophy altogether (e.g., 
psychology, neuroscience, sociology, aesthetics, literary theory).
in that spirit, we hope this collection of papers will be of service in ongoing 
phenomenological and philosophical research.  its value will lie not in 
settling disputes or definitively answering questions concerning habit, 
but in opening up avenues for further research and discussion.  This is 
possible, in part, due to its systematic import, i.e., in clarifying the major 
fault line within husserlian phenomenology demarcating static and genetic 
phenomenology in a way that makes the notion of habit indispensable.  
The phenomenon of habit is also made to appear in this volume in its 
concreteness, i.e., in the broad range of topics that it can help shed light on, 
whether in the way habit relates to the temporal depths of an individual life 
in its development, or in its constant presence as what enables individuals to 
creatively and authentically navigate their surroundings and negotiate their 
interpersonal relations in ways that have cognitive, practical, and ethical 
significance.  Additionally, in their analyses of habit, several contributions 
in this volume not only offer an expansive take on phenomenology’s domain 
of research, but also draw attention to points of contact, e.g., between 
phenomenology as an approach to philosophy and alternative philosophical 
outlooks (e.g., analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive science) and 
theoretical paradigms (e.g., praxeological sociology), sites in which we would 
like to see much more interdisciplinary dialogue on these themes.
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